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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This

is

an

appeal

from

a

dismissal

of

the

plaintiff's

Complaint with prejudice for failing to prosecute.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the lower court abuse is discretion in dismissing the

appellant's Complaint with prejudice for failure to prosecute?
2.

Did the lower court abuse its discretion in signing the

Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order after the plaintiff
filed an objection to said proposed documents?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for a dismissal under Rule 41(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is abuse of discretion.
Lambert, 613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980).

Wilson v.

The appellant contends that

entering an order over its objection creates an issue of law.

The

appellee disagrees with that position.

The appellant's objections

were to the proposed Findings of Facts and were all addressed to
factual issues.
discretion.

Consequently, the standard of review is abusive

In reviewing findings of fact, the appellate court's

duty is to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
findings and to allow the findings to stand unless reasonable minds
could differ.

Marchant v. Park City, 771 P. 2d 677 (Utah App.

1989).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant, Copper State Leasing Company, filed a Complaint
against Kim C. Moore and other defendants on April 24, 1985,
alleging liability arising out of a lease of equipment and personal
guaranties.

No action was taken on the case by the appellant and

on the 1st day of December, 1986, the trial court issued an Order
to Show Cause why the Complaint should not be dismissed for failing
to prosecute.

A hearing was set on this Order to Show Cause on

January 7, 1987.

On December 15, 1986, the appellant's counsel

wrote a letter to the court agreeing to proceed with the case as
soon as possible and with due diligence.

No further action was

taken on the case until a Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on
November 19, 1990. On the 14th day of December, 1990, the appellee
filed a motion for the court to dismiss the appellant's Complaint
for failing to prosecute and latches.

The court granted the

appellee's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute.
for the

appellee

submitted

Conclusions of Law and Order.

the appropriate

Findings

Counsel
of Fact,

The appellant filed an objection to
2

the Findings of Fact, and after having received the same, the court
executed those Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Complaint in this action was filed in April of 1985

seeking to collect from the defendant, Kim C. Moore, pursuant to
an agreement guarantying a lease between the plaintiff and the
defendant, Carver Hunter, Inc.

The plaintiff had repossessed the

property which was security for the lease and sought to obtain a
deficiency judgment against Kim C. Moore with interest at the rate
of 18 percent per annum. (R. 2-12)
2.

On the 1st day of December, 1986, an Order to Show Cause

was issued by the court requiring the parties to show cause why the
Complaint should not be dismissed for failing to prosecute and a
hearing on said motion was set for January 7, 1987. (R. 33)
3.

The plaintiff wrote a letter to the court dated December

15, 1986, in which the plaintiff committed itself to proceed with
the case as soon as possible and with due diligence.
4.

(R. 34)

Thereafter, no change was made in the pleadings and no

further action was taken on the plaintiff's Complaint until the
plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on November 19, 1990.
(R. 38) The court found that the Motion for Summary Judgment could
have been filed as of January of 1987 and that nothing changed
between 1987 and 1990 as between the parties.
5.

(R. 179)

The lease called for interest at the rate of 18 percent

per annum and since 1986; thereby causing additional cost and

3

expense to the defendant if a judgment were to be obtained against
him. (R. 179)
6.

The plaintiff sought to excuse its delay in prosecuting

the case because of a bankruptcy that had been filed by other named
defendants.

Kim C. Moore did not file a bankruptcy and there was

no federal stay order prohibiting the plaintiff from proceeding
with its case in a timely manner. (R. 180)
7.

The

plaintiff

contended

that

it

had

assigned

or

transferred its right in the lease, which is the subject matter of
the Complaint, to Lease West from August of 1986 to 1990.

If that

representation was true, then the lease had been assigned prior to
the December 1, 1986 Order to Show Cause issued by the court and
the December 15, 1986 letter from the plaintiff agreeing to proceed
expeditiously on its case.
8.

(R. 180)

The court found that the plaintiff had failed to timely

prosecute

its case and therefore the plaintiff's

Complaint

should be dismissed with prejudice. (R. 180)
9.

The appellee submitted the proposed Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order to the appellant's counsel by mail on
the 22nd day of March, 1991. The appellant filed objections to the
proposed Findings of Fact, all of which related to Findings of
Fact.

Said objections were dated the

(R. 174-177)

27th day of March, 1991.

The trial court executed the Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order on the 3rd day of April, 1991.
181)

4

(R.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is the appellee's position that the court acted within its
discretion in dismissing the appellant's claim for failure to
prosecute.

The standard of review to be applied by the appellate

court for dismissal under Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is abuse of discretion.

In this case a Complaint was

filed in April of 1985 and no substantial action was taken by the
appellant until December of 1990, approximately a period of five
and one-half years.

The court had previously notified the parties

that the case was going to be dismiss for failing to prosecute in
1986.

A letter from appellant's counsel at that time indicated

that the case would be prosecuted with due diligence.

In spite of

that letter, no action was taken for approximately four years. The
Utah Appellate Courts have indicated that it is the burden of the
plaintiff to prosecute a case in due course without unusual or
unreasonable delay and that it is within the broad discretion of
the trial court to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute.
The

appellee

filed

a motion

to

prosecute and on the theory of latches.
the issue of

dismiss

for

failing

to

The court did not rule on

latches; and, consequently,

any argument by the

appellant in its Brief concerning this issue is not relevant.

The

appellant also has contended that the court committed error in
failing to afford the appellant a hearing on his objections to
appellee's Findings of Fact.

Rule 4-504 does not provide that a

district court judge must allow parties to file a memorandum or to
5

have a hearing on an objection.

In addition, the appellant did not

request such a hearing and did not file a motion under Rule 60(b)
or Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Consequently,

there is no basis upon which this court should reverse the trial
court's decision because of the objection that was filed by the
appellant.

The

trial

court

acted

within

its

discretion

in

dismissing the appellant's Complaint and this court should uphold
the trial court in its decision.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE
APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR FAILING TO PROSECUTE.
The appellant has acknowledged that the standard of review to
be applied by the appellate court for dismissal under Rule 41(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is abusive discretion.

This

court, in the case of Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P. 2d 237 (Utah App.
1989) discussed the discretion of the court in dismissing a case
for failing to prosecute.

This court stated:

It is well established that the trial court may, on its
own motion, dismiss an action for want of prosecution
under Rule 41(b) (Cites) This authority is an 'inherent
power', governed not by rule or statute but by the
control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own
affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases.
(cites)
Therefore, the trial
court has a reasonable latitude of discretion in
dismissing for failure to prosecute if a party fails to
move forward according to the rules and the directions
of the court, without justifiable excuse.
Id at 239.
The appellate courts of this state have made similar rulings in the
cases of Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P. 2d 765 (Utah 1980); Charlie Brown
6

Construction v. Leisure Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah
App. 1987); Brasher Motor and Fin. Co. v. Brown, 461 P.2d 464, 46465 (1969).
In this case, the trial court had entered an Order to Show
Cause for failure to prosecute on the 1st day of December, 1986.
(R.

33)

That

Order

was

dismissed

upon

the

representations

contained in a letter dated December 15, 1986, from the appellantfs
counsel

indicating

diligence. (R. 34)

that

the

case

would

be

pursued

with

due

Thereafter, no action was taken on the case

until November 19, 1990, approximately four years after the letter
and five and one-half years the filing of the Complaint.

Clearly,

the appellant did not move forward with the case in accordance with
the rules and the direction of the court.

The appellant gave no

justifiable excuse for its failure to proceed with the action.
The appellant contends that it had recently filed motions in
this case, and therefore it was abuse of the court's discretion to
dismiss for failing to prosecute.

The plaintiff had not taken any

action in this case between December 15, 1986 and November 21,
1990.

(R. 38)

The appellee filed his Motion to Dismiss on

November 28, 1990, and alleged therein that because of the delay,
the appellee was prejudice because he could no longer locate the
witnesses necessary to defend against the appellant's Complaint.
(Exhibit A to appellant's Brief) Thereafter, the appellee retained
counsel and filed a Motion for Dismissal dated the 14th day of
December, 1990.

(R. 124, Exhibit B to appellant's Brief). In that

Motion the appellee specifically asked, "...for a dismissal of
7

plaintiff's Complaint for failure to prosecute,•.•" The appellant,
in its Brief, contends that no such motion was made on behalf of
the appellee and that the court granted dismissal for failure to
prosecute sua sponte.

(Appellant's Brief, P. 15).

A number of

cases have held that recent activity in a case will not prevent a
court from dismissing a case for failing to prosecute.
(a)

In the case of Carter v. DeCarion, 400 S.2d 521 (Fla.

App. D.3) the court found that a substitution of counsel one
year prior to a motion to dismiss and the filing of a notice
of deposition and settlement negotiations on the same day as
the motion to dismiss did not justify the setting aside of a
dismissal for lack of prosecution.
(b)

In Thompson v. Fleming, 401 Fed. 2d 266 (CA5 Miss.

1968), the court stated it was not an abuse of discretion for
a trial judge to dismiss a suit where plaintiff's counsel had
moved

for

a continuance

on the grounds

that

plaintiff's

counsel had not been able to prepare for trial due to other
pressing business matters.
(c)

In Bryne v. Amalgamated Transit Workers' Union Div.,

A.2d 503 (MD App. 1988), the court held that after notice of
failure to prosecute had been given, further laxity on part
of plaintiff's counsel may constitute basis for dismissing a
cause of action.
(d)

In Timber Tracts, Inc. v. Fergus Electric Coop.,

753 P.2d 854 (Mont. 1988), the court held that dismissal for
failure to prosecute will not be precluded, by a plaintiff's
8

assertion

that

he

delayed

action

because

he

thought

an

automatic stay in bankruptcy court precluded further action.
The court also stated that no reasonable excuse could be found
for inactivity of attorneys in prosecuting a contract action
over a period of six years.
(e)

In Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980), the

Utah Supreme Court affirmed a dismissal under URCP 41(b)
despite the fact that plaintiff served interrogatories just
two weeks prior to defendant's motion to dismiss for failure
to prosecute.
The Utah Court of Appeals

in the case of Charlie

Construction v Leisure Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d

Brown

1368 (Utah App.

1987), addressed a number of issues which have been raised by the
appellant.
15, 1981.

In that case the plaintiff filed a Complaint on June
On December 5, 1983, the court filed a sua sponte order

to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failing to
prosecute.

The parties stipulated that matter could be removed

from the calendar.

On June 15, 1984, plaintiff's counsel informed

the court that a settlement was likely in the case.
1984, the matter was dismissed by the court.

On June 18,

The plaintiff filed

a motion to set aside the dismissal on February 25, 1985, which
motion was denied.

The Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal and

stated that Pursuant to Rule 41(b) the court had the authority sua
sponte to dismiss for lack of prosecution.

The court also stated

that a dismissal under Rule 41(b) operates as an adjudication upon

9

the merits unless otherwise ordered by the court.

The court went

on to state:
f

The burden is upon the plaintiff to prosecute the case
in due course without unusual or unreasonable delay.f
Plaintiffs are required 'to prosecute their claims with
due diligence or accept the penalty of dismissal1...
Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a decision within
the broad discretion of the trial court. This court will
not interfere with that decision unless it clearly
appears that the court has abused its discretion and that
there is a likelihood and injustice has been wrought....
The appellant, in its Brief, contends that the defendant is
obligated to proceed to developing its defense of the case; and if
it fails to do so, is precluded from seeking a dismissal for
failure to prosecute.

Appellee appeared pro se.

The appellee

submitted a Request for Admission, Interrogatories, and a Motion
to Produce

to the

appellant

in

1985.

The

appellee

was not

represented by legal counsel until December of 1990 when a Motion
for Dismissal was promptly filed.
The appellant cites the case of Maxfield v. Rushton, Supra,
in support of its position.

In the Maxfield case there were

numerous legal procedures engaged in prior to the court dismissing
the case for failing to prosecute.

In spite of that activity, the

trial court's dismissal was upheld and the Court of Appeals stated:
"A court's discretion, however, must be balanced against a higher
priority: to 'afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and to
do justice among them'...."

It is the position of the appellee

that over a period of five years the appellant had an opportunity
to litigate this matter, but failed to pursue that opportunity and
failed to honor the commitment which was previous made to the trial

10

court in 1986.

The inactivity of the appellant must be balanced

against an individual who was without legal counsel and lacked the
basic knowledge of legal proceedings.

Given the circumstances and

the difference in the knowledge of the parties, justice requires
that the trial court's dismissal be upheld.
The Utah Appellate Court in Charlie Brown Construction v.
Leisure Sports, Inc., Supra, and Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P. 2d
1323, 1325 (Utah 1975) has stated that the burden of prosecuting
a case and proceeding without unusual or unreasonable delays rests
with the plaintiff.

Other courts have also so held.

In Timber Tracts v. Fergus Electric Coop, Supra., the Montana
Court stated:
The burden is upon the plaintiff to demonstrate a
reasonable excuse for his neglect.
If the plaintiff
fails to carry that burden, the delay is considered
unreasonable and the defendant is presumed to have been
prejudiced.
A similar decision was reached in Rossi v. Mathers, 749 P.2d 964
(Colo. App. 1987).

In that case the court held that the plaintiff

had not demonstrated that any diligent efforts had been made on her
part to move the case forward over a period of three years from the
filing of the Complaint, and that the burden was on the plaintiff
to prosecute the case in due course without unusual or unreasonable
delay.
POINT II
THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM WAS NOT DISMISSED
ON THE THEORY OF LATCHES.
The

appellee

filed

a motion

to

dismiss

the

appellant's

Complaint for failing to prosecute and on the theory of latches.
11

The court granted the appellee's motion based upon failure to
prosecute.
was

The court did not address whether or not the appellee

entitled

to a dismissal

on the theory

of

latches.

The

appellant, in its Brief, contends that the court did not have the
authority to dismiss on the theory of latches and cites a number
of cases for that issue.
It is the position of the appellee, since the court did not
address the issue of latches, that issue is not before this court
and whether or not the trial court could have dismissed on the
theory of latches is not relevant. Consequently, the appellee does
not address that issue and does not respond to those cases cited
by the appellant on the issue of latches.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN EXECUTING THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER.
The appellee submitted Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and an Order pursuant to the direction of the trial judge.

As

indicated in the Statement of Facts, the said documents were mailed
to counsel for the appellant on the 22nd day of March, 1991,
pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
(Certificate contained on Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order, R. 178-181)

Thereafter, the appellant filed an objection

on the 27th day March, 1991, and the court signed the documents on
April 3, 1991. (R. 174-177)
Rule

4-504 of

the

Utah

Code

of

Judicial

Administration

provides that a party may file a notice of objection.
that rule

does not

indicate what procedure,
12

However,

if any, must be

followed by the parties or the court in relationship to said
objection.

If the appellant wanted a hearing on its objections to

the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it could have
requested such a hearing.

Rules 4-501 and 4-502 of the Code of

Judicial Administration provide specific procedures to be followed
on motions and hearings.

Those sections do not specifically apply

to an objection filed under Rule 4-504; however, if requested, the
court would probably have granted the appellant a right to file a
memorandum in support of its objection and an oral argument.
such request was made by the appellant.

No

Consequently, the court

had the authority to consider the objection without additional
input from either of the parties and to rule thereon.

If the

appellant believed that the court did not give due consideration
to its objection, it had the right to file a motion under Rule
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and possible under Rule
59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

A motion was not filed

under either of these rules,
discretion.
CONCLUSIONS
The appellant filed an action in this case in April of 1985
and did not pursue the case until December of 1990, approximately
five and one-half years. During this period of time, the court had
previously moved to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute and
the appellant's counsel, in December of 1986, had committed itself
to proceed with due diligence.

State law authorizes the court to

dismiss a case for failure to prosecute if the plaintiff fails to
13

move

forward with the case

unreasonable delays.

in due course without

unusual

or

It is the appellee's position that the trial

judge's decision was not an abuse of discretion and that the facts
viewed

most

decision.

favorably

in

light

of

the

appellee

support

that

The appellee respectfully requests that the court deny

the relief sought by the appellant.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of October, 1991.

ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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